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cumstances, have some diff iculty i n having good homes 
f o u n d (e.g., if they are of minor i ty races or if the mother 
carried some genetic disease or was a k n o w n substance 
abuser). Some social circumstances may be so oppressive 
that the mother can predict only a life of extreme hardship 
for her offspring, e.g., if she is a black mother i n South 
Afr i ca . If we consider practices w h i c h affect embryos early 
i n development, " s u r p l u s " embryos produced by in vitro 
fertil ization or "embryo f l u s h i n g " may be in demand from 
couples w i t h a distorted sense of the fetus as commodity, or 
whose heterosexists bias reflect parental values the mother 
finds unacceptable for chi ld-rearing. (For a truly frighten-
i n g version of a foreseeable Brave New World of reproduc-
tive control i n w h i c h one w o u l d not want one's chi ldren to 
be raised, see Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale.) 
Hence, it is not only ownership that might lead a 
w o m a n to want her embryo or fetus destroyed if she was no 
longer prepared to nurture it, but also her vis ion of threats 
facing the developing c h i l d . A n analysis attentive to the 
interests of chi ldren and women, as Overall insists is 
necessary, must recognize that protecting the interests of 
the embryo does not necessarily mean preserving its life. I 
th ink embryos are entitled to what philosophers cal l a 
"paternal ist" approach i n w h i c h others must decide the 
best interests of the developing organism; and it is legiti-
mate (and compatible w i t h Overall 's general theme that 
the interests of fetuses ought not to be viewed as being i n 
confl ict w i t h those of their mothers) that the person w h o 
has the most intimate relat ionship w i t h the fetus and w h o 
has the most invested i n its development—i.e., the 
mother—should be the one to decide on how its interests 
may best be served. 
Moreover, whi le her recommendation to a l low the 
mother to expel the fetus if she finds cont inuing preg-
nancy unacceptable may be logical ly consistent w i t h her 
view that no one has a r ight to secure the death of that 
fetus, i n practice this separation is dangerous to feminist 
aims. As Overal l acknowledges, surviving abortion may 
produce further harms to the fetus w h i c h , inevitably, put 
the w o m a n i n conflict w i t h the fetus i n the case of abor-
t ion. Surely, such conflicts w i l l again be considered as 
adequate grounds for restricting women's access to abor-
t ion. T h e dif f iculty here is that Overal l has strayed from 
her v is ion of seeing reproduction as a process w i t h mother 
and fetus conceptually and physical ly connected. For 
women, reproduction is far more involved than s imply 
hous ing the fetus, and it makes a mockery of their con-
cerns to imagine a social practice that can br ing about the 
independence of the fetus when the mother determines 
that the pregnancy can no longer be tolerated but is u n w i l -
l i n g to surrender the care of the fetus to the state. I believe 
women are i n a privileged posi t ion w i t h respect to the 
fetuses developing i n their bodies, and that, i n most cir-
cumstances, they are entitled to decide the future of those 
fetuses. T h i s is not because they o w n the fetuses, for they 
ought not to be free to sell them, but because they are 
responsible for them and should be trusted to decide if 
cont inued life when removed from the w o m b is i n the best 
interest of the fetus. A n y other pol icy, especially any 
w h i c h insists on trying to save every premature infant no 
matter h o w damaged, or w h i c h al lows the patriarchal 
state to determine the survival question, w o u l d be contrary 
to the interests of women and chi ldren. O n l y the mother is 
l ike ly to make such decisions i n a l o v i n g way (since I 
believe death can be a l o v i n g decision). W i t h o u t the 
authority to decide these questions women w i l l not have 
the reproductive freedom necessary, and, i n particular, 
they w i l l certainly have difficulty i n getting abortions. 
Despite my disagreement i n these important areas, I 
w i s h to recommend Overall 's book w i t h enthusiasm. It is 
wel l written and very wel l conceived. It is important to 
consider these various aspects and practices of reproduc-
t ion i n conjunct ion w i t h one another. Together they con-
stitute our attitudes about reproductive matters and about 
those persons most closely involved i n reproductive activ-
ity, women and chi ldren. Hence it is important to discuss 
the issues i n a comprehensive fashion, being sensitive to 
h o w our attitudes i n one area influence developing prac-
tice i n another. In particular, her discussion of the dangers 
of sex preselection and surrogacy help clarify the need to 
avoid a s imple analysis of consumer choice as the founda-
t ion for reproductive freedom i n matters of ch i ldb i r th and 
abort ion. T h e choice feminists are a r g u i n g for must be 
viewed as a comprehensive control over the reproductive 
aspects of our lives i n a manner compatible w i t h the 
autonomy of other women and chi ldren. T h i s book helps 
us to clarify that goal. 
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In The Science Question in Feminism H a r d i n g takes on 
the most thorough analysis of feminist critiques of science 
to date. H a r d i n g does this through a discussion of what 
she considers to be the five m a i n research problematics of 
feminism and science. Her most important contr ibut ion 
to these projects comes i n her discussion of the future of 
science. As a standpoint theorist, H a r d i n g accepts that 
knowledge is socially constructed and, further, that i n a 
g lobal patriarchy it is constructed w i t h class, sex and race 
biases. These biases range f rom the obvious pattern of 
us ing males as the n o r m i n scientific research to meta-
sexist conflat ions of male sex-role socialization w i t h onto-
logical and metaphysical c la ims. T h e latter occurs when, 
for example, the most abstract and decontextualized 
science, namely physics, becomes the paradigm for a l l of 
the sciences. Such bias is evidenced i n the hierarchical 
ordering of knowledge f rom the " h a r d " to the "soft" 
sciences where hard sciences are given more prestige and 
prior i ty than are the soft sciences. 
H a r d i n g ' s solut ion to the problem of the patriarchal 
biases i n science, is to ca l l for a radical reconstruction of 
science i n accordance w i t h feminist values. These values, 
c la ims H a r d i n g , are entailed by standpoint feminism. 
Further, such a value orientation or standpoint leads to 
the feminist project of just i fy ing standpoint feminism as 
more "objective" than traditional male-biased science. 
T h e seeming paradox of c l a i m i n g that a l l knowledge is 
socially constructed and also that standpoint feminism is 
more objective is resolved for H a r d i n g by virtue of her 
redefinit ion of objectivity. H a r d i n g does not lay c l a i m to 
the positivist understanding of objectivity. Rather, H a r d -
i n g argues that feminism is objective, according to a 
rec la iming of the term objectivity w i t h a signif icantly 
different meaning. She argues that feminist values max-
imize objectivity but defines objectivity as fol lows, 
Objectivity is not maximized through value-neutral-
ity at least not i n the way the tradit ional science 
discourses have construed these concepts...it is only 
coercive values—racism, classism, sexism—that de-
teriorate objectivity; it is participatory values— 
antiracism, anticlassism, antisexism—that decrease 
the distortions and mystif ications i n our culture's 
explanations and understandings, (p. 249) 
A c c o r d i n g to Harding ' s reconstructed understanding of 
objectivity, the standpoint feminist perspective w h i c h 
includes liberatory values is more objective because it 
decreases the misrepresentations of other races and classes 
as wel l as women. Hence, the feminist standpoint w h i c h 
argues that the standpoint of feminism offers a privileged 
pos i t ion w i t h respect to p r o v i d i n g a broader explanat ion 
of the social and life sciences, according to H a r d i n g , lays 
d o w n the preconditions for a reconstruction of objectivity. 
T h e privi leged posi t ion of f emin ism comes f rom the 
understanding w h i c h a raised consciousness incorporates. 
T h e feminist standpoint understands the perspective of 
both the oppressor and the oppressed. She argues, 
the paradigm models of objective science are those 
studies expl ic i t ly directed by moral ly and pol i t i ca l ly 
emancipatory interests—that is, by interests i n e l im-
ina t ing sexist, racist, classist, and cultural ly coercive 
understandings of nature and social life. F r o m the 
perspective of this second unity-of-science contin-
u u m , the more abstract arenas of h u m a n thought 
s imply occupy the other end of the c o n t i n u u m ; 
morals and politics appear there, as wel l , though i n 
their most abstract and least expl ic i t forms. Physics 
and chemistry, mathematics and logic, bear the f in -
gerprints of their distinctive cultural creators no less 
than do anthropology and history. A maximal ly 
objective science, natural or social, w i l l be one that 
includes a self-conscious and critical examinat ion of 
the relationship between the social experience of its 
creators and the kinds of cognitive structures favored 
i n its inquiry , (p. 250) 
Harding 's approach is interesting for it is one of the 
more sustained attempts to ground feminist science epis-
temologically. However, ultimately it is unsatisfactory. 
T o rename relativistic claims "objective" is merely m u d -
d y i n g the water. One of the most important projects 
w h i c h feminists have undertaken is to unmask the en-
gendering of knowledge as sex-biased. T h i s project is 
related to feminist understandings about the relationship 
between interests, values and the kinds of observations and 
theories w h i c h one postulates and accepts. T o move from 
this posi t ion to c la im that somehow feminists are more 
objective is to miss the significance of feminist under-
standings of the epistemological relativism w h i c h is essen-
tial to feminist crit ique. Further, H a r d i n g cannot answer 
the problem of w h i c h feminist standpoint to grant max-
i m a l objectivity. If, as standpoint theorists believe, stand-
point feminism is superior because feminist understand-
i n g encompasses both the perspective of being oppressed 
and the perspective of the oppressor, then the most 
oppressed person has ceteris paribus the most objective 
understanding. T h i s means that objective knowledge 
should be constructed by, for example, disabled women of 
colour l i v i n g i n oppressed and exploited countries. Every-
one else w i l l necessarily have a partial and perverse inter-
pretation of knowledge. 
Despite the unsatisfactory nature of Harding ' s proposal 
for grounding feminist science, her book is r ich both i n 
terms of her analysis of feminist cri t ique and her under-
standing of the relationship between science and exploita-
t ion. T h i s book is worth reading for any feminist inter-
ested i n theory and scientific knowledge. 
Deborah C . Poff 
M o u n t Saint Vincent University 
